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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Montes'
(decided November 24, 2009)
A jury convicted Omar Montes of criminal possession of a
893 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009). Subsequently, on February 17, 2011, the
New York Court of Appeals held that "[tjhe trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a mistrial or to strike Ceballo's testimony because the inability to re-
call Ceballo did not violate defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause." People v.
Montes, 2011 WL 534082 (N.Y. 2011). The Court noted that there is no authority which
holds that the guaranteed right of confrontation "includes a right to recall a witness and con-
front her about things she did or said after her cross-examination, conducted without any re-
striction of which defendant complains [because these out-of-court statements in fact helped
the defendant], was already completed." Id. Notably Chief Judge Lippman wrote a concur-
ring opinion stating that although he agreed the decision should be affirmed, he nevertheless
did not agree with the majority that this affirmance should be based on rejecting the defen-
dant's confrontation clause claim. Id. (Lippman, C.J., concurring). Rather, Lippman joined
in the affirmance of the decision because by acquitting Montes of murder in the second de-
gree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, "the jury decisively rejected
Ceballo's account and, accordingly, it does not appear that the defendant ultimately was pre-
judiced by the jury's consideration of her incompletely vetted testimony." Id Lippman
stated that when "testimony adverse to the defendant upon a non-collateral matter has been
placed before the jury and the defendant has not been afforded an opportunity fully and fair-
ly to test that testimony by cross-examination, the right of confrontation has been infringed."
Id. Thus, according to Lippman:
Inasmuch as Ceballo was the only witness who claimed to have seen
[the] defendant engage in conduct likely incident to the actual use of a
gun against the victim, the circumstance that her account of the relevant
events was not in crucial respects fully explored and tested before the
jury constituted a denial of the right of confrontation. Nor does it seem
questionable that this denial raised a substantial danger of prejudice. It
appeared at the time of defendant's motion to strike that Ceballo's testi-
mony would, if credited, in combination with the forensic evidence
strongly militate in favor of a verdict convicting defendant of murder. In
this context, any evidence that Ceballo had not been truthful about her
role in the events directly at issue was, from [the] defendant's perspec-
tive, absolutely to be brought to the jury's attention through cross-
examination; a stipulation was not a substitute for vigorous confrontation
of the witness in open court ....
Montes, 2011 WL 534082 (emphasis added).
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weapon in the third degree for his involvement in the shooting death
of Robinson Lopez and sentenced him to a term of seven years in
prison. 2 On appeal, Montes claimed the trial court denied his consti-
tutional right to confront a witness pursuant to the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution3 and article I, section 6 of the New
York State Constitution.4 Specifically, Montes argued that the trial
court denied him the opportunity to recall a key witness and cross-
examine her with regard to key evidence-evidence the witness re-
vealed to the prosecutor after the defense's initial cross-
examination-which damaged the witness' credibility and supported
his innocence.' The appellate division affirmed the conviction since
the "[d]efendant had already had a full opportunity to cross examine
[the witness]," and, in the alternative, ruled that even if the trial court
committed error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
On June 3, 2004, an argument occurred between Lopez, Lo-
pez's ex-girlfriend, Loraine Ceballo, and her friend Tamika Taylor.'
Lopez insulted Ceballo's new boyfriend, Charles Gonzalez, who soon
arrived at the scene with the defendant, Montes.8 An argument en-
sued and shortly afterwards the police received a radio communica-
tion of "shots fired," and found Lopez dead behind a building.9
Upon investigation, the police recovered one bullet and nine .380 ca-
liber shell casings from the scene.o After further ballistic testing, the
officers concluded that six shell casings originated from one gun and
the remaining three shell casings originated from another gun."
However, all four recovered bullets, one from the scene and three
from the autopsy, derived from a single gun.12
2 Monies, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, which states in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civ-
il actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted
with the witnesses against him or her."
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At trial, Ceballo testified that she observed Gonzalez and
Montes approach Lopez's car and "raise their hands 'in a fist form,'
and saw that they were holding something in their hands." 3 When
questioned at trial whether she could identify the objects in their
hands, Ceballo stated she could not; however, during a prior inter-
view with detectives regarding the investigation, as well as during her
grand jury testimony, Ceballo stated definitively that both men held
guns. 14 Further, Ceballo testified at trial that after she heard three
shots fired, both Gonzalez and Montes ran past her in the building's
lobby empty-handed.'"
After Ceballo's testimony, both direct and cross-examination,
the prosecutor's office re-interviewed Ceballo and Taylor.16 During
the interview, outside of Ceballo's presence, Taylor admitted that
"she and Ceballo ran into the building with the two men," and Gonza-
lez "put a gun or guns in Ceballo's purse after the shooting." 7 Ce-
ballo, when confronted by Taylor in front of the prosecutor, acknowl-
edged these facts; however, she "went 'back and forth' on whether
she received one or two guns, and said that she did not know."" The
following day, Taylor testified in court that "Gonzalez put at least
one gun in Ceballo's purse."' 9 Further, she stated that she and Cebal-
lo "boarded the elevator . .. and [Ceballo] asked, '[W]hat am I going
to do with the guns?' "20
In addition to the testimony provided by Ceballo and Taylor,
Dominick Castro, the victim's close friend, testified as an eye-
witness to the shooting, stating that Gonzalez possessed the only gun
at the scene, shot Lopez once, and continued to shoot while Montes
stood with his arms crossed watching from a distance. 21 The People
also called another witness, Carlos Pino, after Ceballo revealed the
information regarding the gun or guns she received from Gonzalez.22
Pino testified that Taylor informed him that Gonzalez shot Lopez and
14 id
" Montes, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
16 id
17 Id. (emphasis added).
18 id
19 Id.
20 Montes, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
21 Id. at 519 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 520-21.
2011] 807
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further that the defendant called Pino "asking him to call Taylor to
find out what 'that girl did with them things.' "23 Additionally, Pino
testified that Taylor informed him Gonzalez placed two guns in Ce-
ballo's bag after the shooting.24
Since Ceballo failed to testify regarding the placement of a
gun or guns in her purse, the defense requested that the court recall
Ceballo for further cross-examination.25 However, the request was
denied because Ceballo, after enduring what the court described as "a
consummately skillful and exhaustive cross examination," suffered
severe emotional injuries and attempted suicide.26 Consequently, the
"[d]efendant moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, to strike Ceballo's
testimony." 27 The trial court denied the motion, stating that "the is-
sue of whether Ceballo was given one or more guns was [only] a mi-
nor portion of her testimony." 28
Additionally, the court denied the defendant's request to pro-
vide a missing witness charge for Ceballo to the jury.29 As a result of
this denial, the parties entered into a stipulation, which stated that
"Ceballo was not honest when she testified . .. [,] she failed to state
that . .. Gonzalez ... gave her the gun or guns," and that "Ceballo is
unavailable to be recalled by either side." 30  The jury convicted
Montes "of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree," and
acquitted him of "murder in the second degree and criminal posses-
sion of a weapon in the second degree."3  The defendant received a
sentence of "the statutory maximum of seven years in prison."3 2
Montes appealed the decision, alleging the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his right to recall and further cross-examine
Ceballo pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the United States and
the New York State Constitutions. 33 The appellate division affirmed
23 Id at 521.
24 id.





3o Monies, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
1 Id.
32 Id. The defendant also claimed his sentence was excessive and requested the court to
reduce it. Id. at 518. On appeal, the court did not "find it necessary to substitute [its] discre-
tion for that of the trial court to reduce the sentence." Id. at 519.
1 Monies, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
808 [Vol. 27
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the ruling of the trial court, holding that because a trial judge retains
broad discretion to limit the defendant's questioning of witnesses, the
trial judge correctly determined that the "defendant's right to con-
front Ceballo was protected, since he was afforded the 'opportunity
to probe and expose . .. infirmities' in Ceballo's testimony." 34 The
court noted that in addition to already conducting adequate cross-
examination of Ceballo, the defense counsel "had ample opportunity
to engage in cross-examination of two [other] witnesses" on the issue
of whether Ceballo received a gun or guns following the shooting.
Furthermore, the court stated that the defendant, through the stipula-
tion, fully resolved the issue of Ceballo's credibility with the jury,
which itself "weigh[ed] heavily against a finding of a constitutional
violation. "36 Ultimately, the court held that "even if the trial court
erred by failing to declare a mistrial or striking Ceballo's testimony
... the error was harmless . . . [because] the evidence amply estab-
lished [the] defendant's guilt of criminal possession of [a] weapon in
the third degree."37
Justice Abdus-Salaam dissented on two grounds.3 8 First, al-
though the majority concluded that the defense was afforded a full
opportunity to cross-examine Ceballo, the majority "misse[d] the
point that [the] defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her
regarding the bombshell revelation about having been given the gun
or guns."39 Second, "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
strike Ceballo's testimony," and further, the dissent rejected the ma-
jority's argument that even if the trial court erred, the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.40
The dissent emphasized the importance of Ceballo's testimo-
ny to the prosecution's case. 4 1 Although the defense had an opportu-
34 Id. at 518 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)).
3s Id.
36 Id
3 Id. The majority refers to evidence of one bullet and nine .380 caliber shell casings re-
covered from the crime scene. Montes, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 516. The ballistics investigation
revealed that six shell casings originated from one gun and the remaining three from a
second gun. Id. Investigators deemed the shell casings " 'fresh,' meaning that they did not
appear to have been there for any length of time because they were not crushed or dis-
turbed." Id. at 522 (Abdus-Salaam, I., dissenting).
3 Id. at 519.
' Id. at 520.
40 Montes, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
41 Id. at 522.
2011] 809
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nity to cross-examine two other witnesses regarding the issue of the
gun or guns Ceballo possessed, the dissent argued "this was no subs-
titute for cross-examination of... the only. . . [witness] with person-
al knowledge as to whether she had been given one or two guns."42
While the majority reasoned that the stipulation reached by the par-
ties resolved the issue of Ceballo's credibility entirely against the
prosecution, the dissent concluded that:
Stipulations cannot substitute for confrontation, be-
cause confrontation envisions a personal examination
and cross-examination of the witness in which the ac-
cused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.43
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, which held that
even without Ceballo's testimony the evidence of the case sufficient-
ly established the defendant's guilt, the dissent argued that without
the testimony of Ceballo-the only eyewitness who testified to see-
ing the defendant with a gun-the forensic evidence fell far short of
establishing the defendant's guilt." While the majority placed great
weight on the fact that the police investigation confirmed the exis-
tence of shell casings from two different guns at the scene, the dissent
stated that "the forensic evidence does not show that there were two
guns at the scene at the time of the shooting, only that at some point,
there was a gun fired in the parking lot that was different from the
gun that was used to shoot the victim." 45 Without Ceballo's testimo-
ny, the prosecution's case against the defendant lacked merit; thus, as
the dissent argued, the majority erred in holding "that the failure to
42 Id. at 520.
43 Id. at 521 (quoting People v. Chin, 490 N.E.2d 505, 511 n.3 (N.Y. 1986)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). For more information regarding the use of stipulations and whether a
stipulation can substitute as a replacement for a defendant's right to confrontation, see Mat-
tox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). See generally David J. Tess, Losing the Right to
Confront: Defining Waiver to Better Address a Defendant's Actions and Their Effects on a
Witness, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 877, 881-92 (1994) (discussing that a defendant may lose
the right to confront a witness).
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strike Ceballo's testimony was harmless error."46
Since a conviction must not be set aside if the court can con-
fidently state that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the dissent argued the majority could not, with confi-
dence, declare that the trial court committed error, harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt; therefore, the dissent found that the conviction
must be reversed.4 7
The United States Federal Courts, in determining whether a
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, strongly rely on
the fundamental necessity of a criminal defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him. In Pointer v. Texas,4 8 the Supreme Court
held that the use of the transcript of a witness' testimony at a prelimi-
nary hearing denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to con-
front and cross-examine the witnesses against him. 49 During the pre-
liminary hearing, the defendant represented himself and failed to
conduct a cross-examination of the victim Kenneth Phillips; however,
he cross-examined other witnesses during the same hearing.o Before
the trial, Phillips moved to California and, as a result, the prosecution
"offered the transcript of Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary
hearing as evidence against [the defendant] ." The defendant, who
obtained outside counsel prior to the trial, objected to the offering of
the transcript as evidence, as this denied the defendant his right to
confront the witnesses against him.52 The trial court overruled the
objection because the defendant, at the preliminary hearing, pos-
sessed the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.53
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision and the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the constitu-
tional claim.54
The Court reasoned that since the Framers of the Constitution
included the right to confront witnesses through cross-examination in
the Sixth Amendment, the right to confrontation was a fundamental
46 Id. at 522-23.
47 Id. at 523. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (Van Arsdall 1), 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
48 (Pointer 1), 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
49 Id. at 407-08.
'0 Id. at 401.
5 Id.
52 id
5 Pointer 1, 380 U.S. at 402.
54 Id, cert. granted, Pointer v. Texas (Pointer 11), 379 U.S. 815 (1964).
2011] 8 11
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right essential to a fair trial." As such, the Court held that the defen-
dant's conviction must be reversed since the preliminary hearing tes-
timony offered into evidence denied the defendant his constitutional
right to confront the witness. 56
Similarly, in Davis v. Alaska," the Court relied on the fun-
damental protections of the Confrontation Clause when it held that
the Alaska Supreme Court improperly limited questioning regarding
a witness' possible bias due to the witness' probationary status as a
juvenile delinquent and therefore violated the defendant's constitu-
tional right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation
Clause. In Davis, the defendant allegedly stole a safe from a bar in
Anchorage, Alaska.59 State troopers discovered the safe, pried open
and emptied of its contents, near the home of Jess Straight and his
family. 60 Richard Green, Straight's stepson, informed investigators
that he observed two "Negro men standing alongside a late-model
metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near where the safe was . . . discov-
ered."61 Subsequently, Green identified the defendant as one of the
men he encountered and recalled the defendant's possession of
"something like a crowbar in his hands."62
Before trial, the prosecution moved for a protective order to
prevent the defense from cross-examining Green regarding his juve-
nile record.63 Rather than introducing the evidence to impeach
Green's character as an honest witness, the defense requested that the
court allow questioning to inform the jury that at the time he assisted
police in the investigation, Green continued to serve probation for a
prior burglary.64 However, the trial court granted the protective order
and denied the defense the opportunity to completely cross-examine
s Id. at 404.
56 Id. at 407-08.
s 415 U.S. 308 (1974).




62 Davis, 415 U.S. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id. at 310-11 ("Green was on probation . .. for burglarizing two cabins.").
64 Id. at 311. The defense believed that "[n]ot only might Green have made a hasty and
faulty identification of petitioner to shift suspicion away from himself as one who robbed the
Polar Bar, but Green might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made
his identifications under fear of possible probation revocation." Id.
[Vol. 27812
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Green and inform the jury of his prior burglary conviction.
By holding that the limitation on the defense's questioning
violated the defendant's right to effectively cross-examine witnesses,
the Court referred to the importance of cross-examination.66 The
Court stated that:
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimo-
ny are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion
of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly ha-
rassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only
permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the
witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-
examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach,
i.e., discredit, the witness.67
Thus, in light of the importance of cross-examination, the Court re-
fused to "accept the Alaska Supreme Court's conclusion that the
cross-examination that was permitted .. . was adequate to develop the
issue of bias properly to the jury."68
Expanding on the Supreme Court's precedent, Delaware v.
Fensterer69 recognized that although a defendant's right to confronta-
tion remained a critical aspect of a fair trial, and accordingly required
the utmost protection, this right was not without limits. The Court
stated that the Confrontation Clause afforded the defense "a full and
fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities [in a witness' tes-
timony] through cross-examination."7 0 Further, "the Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish."7 1  For this reason, the ability to
cross-examine is not limitless; "trial judges retain wide latitude to
65 id.
6 Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
67 id.
61 Id. at 318.
69 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
7o Id. at 22. See People v. Mercardo, 655 N.Y.S.2d 474, 474 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1997)
(holding "[t]here was no violation of the Confrontation Clause because the defense was giv-
en the opportunity to expose infirmities in the witness's direct testimony through cross-
examination").
n Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20.
2011] 8 13
9
Morales: Appellate Division, First Department: People v. Montes
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
impose reasonable limits on such interactions." 72 A trial judge may
impose "reasonable limit[ations] on . . . cross-examination based on
concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant." 73
In Fensterer, a jury convicted the defendant of murdering his
fiance. 74 The theory upon which the State based its case included
circumstantial evidence that the defendant strangled the victim with a
cat leash, which contained hair similar to the victim's.7' Thus, the
entire case revolved around the testimony of an expert witness, Allen
Robillard.76 During his testimony, Robillard explained to the jury
that one of the hairs on the cat leash, similar to that of the victim, ap-
peared forcibly removed. Robillard identified three ways in which
a hair may be forcibly removed; however, when asked in which man-
ner he concluded this particular hair had been removed, he could not
recall the method on which he based his opinion.
The defendant requested that the court strike Robillard's tes-
timony because it precluded adequate cross-examination as to which
method the expert used in his determination; however, the trial court
denied the request.79 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction on the basis of the Confrontation Clause, reason-
ing that effective cross-examination required the witness to settle on a
basis for his opinion to enable the defense to effectively attack Robil-
lard's credibility and discredit his testimony in the eyes of the jury.8
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Delaware Supreme Court, holding that the witness' inability to
recall the theory upon which he based his opinion "did not offend the
Confrontation Clause" since "the right to cross-examine is [not] de-
nied ... whenever the witness' lapse of memory impedes one method
of discrediting him."8 1 The court reasoned that:
72 Montes, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
7 See Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 679.
74 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 16.
* Id
76 Id.
71 Id at 16-17.
7 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 17.
so Id. at 17-18.
" Id at 19-20, 22.
814 [Vol. 27
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The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that
every witness called by the prosecution will refrain
from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the Confronta-
tion Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose
these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for
giving scant weight to the witness' testimony.82
Therefore, the Court stated that the jury could infer from the witness'
inability to recall the specific method employed to reach his conclu-
sion that the expert witness lacked sufficient credibility throughout
his entire testimony.8 3
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,84 the Court further expanded its
Confrontation Clause analysis by conducting a harmless error analy-
sis. In Van Arsdall, during the cross-examination of a key witness,
the defense counsel was prohibited from asking questions regarding
the prosecution's dismissal of a criminal charge against the witness in
exchange for the witness' cooperation at trial.85 The court also re-
fused to allow cross-examination regarding an unrelated homicide,
with which the witness was allegedly involved. 86 Outside the pres-
ence of the jury, the witness assured the court that the agreement with
the prosecutor's office failed to affect his testimony, and further, that
the officers' questioning in the subsequent homicide investigation in
no way influenced or affected his testimony. 7 Therefore, the trial
court refused to allow cross-examination concerning the agreement
and the homicide investigation.
The jury convicted the defendant, Robert Van Arsdall, of
"first-degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony." 89 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, stating that the trial court unlawfully restricted the de-
82 Id. at 21-22.
" Id. at 19.
84 Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).




89 Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 677.
2011] 8 15
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fense's right to an effective cross-examination, and thus violated the
defendant's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.90 Fur-
ther, "such [a] violation required automatic reversal" 91 of the convic-
tion since the refusal to allow cross-examination kept key facts from
the jury concerning the witness' bias, an essential element in deter-
mining a witness' credibility. 92
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether this restriction on cross-examination violated the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights and whether this required an au-
tomatic reversal of the conviction. 93  The Court agreed with the
Delaware Supreme Court and concluded that since "the trial court
prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the witness] would be
biased," the decision of the court violated the defendant's "rights se-
cured by the Confrontation Clause." 94 However, the Court did not
agree that such a violation required an automatic reversal of the con-
viction.95 In this regard, the Court held that an improper denial of a
constitutional right to confrontation "is subject to [the Chapman v.
California]96 harmless-error analysis," which requires a court to ask:
Whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing
court might nonetheless say that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt ... [and weigh] factors
[which] include the importance of the witness' testi-
mony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution's case. 97
Rather than use "a per se error" reversal rule, which neglects to de-
9 Id.
' Id. at 674.
92 id
9 Delaware v. Van Arsdall (Van Arsdall ll), 473 U.S. 923 (1985).
94 Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 679.
9 Id. at 674.
9 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
9 Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 684.
[Vol. 27816
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termine the "actual prejudicial impact of such an error," 98 the Court
remanded the case for a "determination whether the Confrontation
Clause error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."99
In his dissent, Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's
conclusion that a complete denial of questioning aimed to expose the
bias of a particular witness violated the Confrontation Clause; how-
ever, he argued that since cross-examination is a vital part of a crimi-
nal trial, the denial of proper cross-examination "should lead to no
less than a reversal of the conviction." 00
The Second Circuit, in Brinson v. Walker,'0' concluded that
the limited cross-examination on the racial bias of the witness, " 'de-
prived the defendant of [disclosing] critical evidence that could have
allowed the trier of fact to conclude that the complainant fabricated
the robbery accusation.' "102 In Brinson, the defendant claimed that
the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the wit-
nesses against him when it denied him the opportunity to question the
victim regarding his racial bias.103 Brinson, a black male, maintained
that "Gavin's accusation was a deliberate lie, motivated by Gavin's
racial hatred of black people." 04 For this reason, the defense sought
to cross-examine Gavin regarding his employment and his refusal to
98 Id. at 677-78 (internal quotation marks omitted). Compare Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 (dis-
cussing the "per se error rule" and holding that "defense counsel should have been permitted
to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness," therefore, the
denial of effective cross-examination was a " 'constitutional error of the first magnitude' "
(quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966))), and Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 688 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("Davis mandates reversal whenever the prosecution puts a witness on
the stand but the court does not permit the defense to cross-examine concerning relevant po-
tential bias."), with Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (discussing the "harmless-error analysis" in
which a court must show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained").
" Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 684 (majority opinion). See Davis, 415 U.S. at 317.
0 Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Pointer v Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 405 (1965) (noting that "cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal"). "Davis mandates rever-
sal whenever the prosecution puts a witness on the stand but the court does not permit the
defense to cross-examine concerning relevant potential bias." Van Arsdall 1, 475 U.S. at
688.
101 (Brinson 1), 547 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2008).
102 Id. at 391 (quoting Brinson v. Walker (Brinson 11), 407 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480
(W.D.N.Y. 2006)).
103 Brinson I, 547 F.3d at 389.
'0 Id. at 390.
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serve black guests. os The trial court denied the defense the ability to
cross-examine Gavin with regard to this issue since "evidence of sub-
sequent racial bias was insufficient ... to show any bias on the date
involved in this crime." 0 6
On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction "ruling that there
was no right to cross-examine the accuser on such racial bias because
it represented general ill will rather than specific hostility toward
[the] defendant, and would thus have risked confusing the jury." 07
Brinson brought a petition to the district court to set aside the convic-
tion and the district court granted the writ of appeal.' 0 8  The court
stated that if the racial bias of a witness is "of sufficient intensity that
it is reasonably likely to result in the falsification of the witness's tes-
timony against the accused, a preclusion of cross-examination . .. is
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court decisional law."' 0 9
Thus, although a trial court maintains broad discretion to impose rea-
sonable limitations on cross-examination, by prohibiting Brinson
from questioning Gavin regarding his extreme racial bias, the trial
court abused its discretion and violated the Confrontation Clause."'0
The New York state courts take a somewhat more restrictive
approach to the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause than the
federal courts. The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Cor-
by' employed a restrictive approach in determining whether the trial
court violated the Confrontation Clause by deferring to the discretion
of the trial judge."2 In Corby, the jury convicted the defendant of
murder in the second degree and first degree robbery.' 13 The defen-
dant paid Xanderia Burnett for the use of her apartment to complete a
drug transaction. 114 The defendant and two other men awaited the ar-
rival of a shipment of heroin, which the victim, Yousef Mohammed,
105 Id. The defense sought to cross-examine Gavin "on whether he was fired from his job
at the Perkins Restaurant for refusing to serve black patrons . . . Brinson [also] proposed to
call the supervisor to testify to Gavin's words in the event Gavin denied it." Id.
106 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Brinson I, 547 F.3d at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 Id at 391.
109 Id. at 393.
110 Id. at 394-95.
.I. 844 N.E.2d 1135 (N.Y. 2005).
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delivered." 5  After the delivery, Burnett discovered Mohammed's
bloody body laying face down on the bed.' 16 Burnett aided the de-
fendant and the other men in removing the body from the apart-
ment."' When police questioned Burnett about the occurrence of the
murder in her apartment, she denied having any knowledge of the in-
cident."' However, two years after the murder, the investigating de-
tective informed Burnett that the defendant implicated her in the
murder of Mohammed.119 As a result, Burnett identified the defen-
dant and the two other men as the individuals who murdered Mo-
hammed.'20
At trial, the defendant cross-examined Burnett; however, the
court precluded any inquiry into her motivation for testifying against
the defendant since such evidence would "confuse the jury, cause
speculation and place defendant's alleged statement before the jury
without the People having had the opportunity to cross-examine
him."'21 In affirming the decision of the courts below, the New York
Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court provided the defendant
with wide latitude to show Burnett's motive to lie and permitted the
scope of cross-examination to include questions which elicited both
her "bias and hostility toward[s] [the] defendant." 22  Further, the
court reasoned that all of the testimony and evidence, which the jury
accumulated throughout the trial, clearly showed Burnett's bias and
motive to lie. 121
However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Smith argued that
the trial court precluded the defendant from questioning the witness
regarding "the most crucial evidence that went to Burnett's motive to
lie," and therefore, "deprived [the defendant] of his constitutional
right to confront his accuser and present a defense." 24 Notably, "the
" id.
"' Corby, 844 N.E.2d at 1136.
117 Id.
"' Id. at 1137.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Corby, 844 N.E.2d at 1137.
122 id.
123 Id. at 1138. See Chin, 490 N.E.2d at 511 ("If bias or interest has been fully explored
through other means, or the precluded area involved cumulative matter already presented,
there generally has been no infringement of the right of confrontation." (internal citations
omitted)).
124 Corby, 844 N.E.2d at 1138 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting).
8 1920 11]
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People's case against defendant was only as strong as the testimony
of Burnett," meaning that without her testimony the People would
have a meritless claim.125 "Because Burnett's testimony was so cru-
cial to the People's case, defendant's cross-examination as to her mo-
tive to fabricate her testimony regarding who was responsible for the
crimes was equally important to the defense." 26 Thus, the dissent
declared that the lower courts erred in denying the defendant his con-
stitutional right to confront his accuser, the only individual with evi-
dence linking the defendant to the murder and further declared that
the "error [was] not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 27
Contrary to the rationale of the dissent in Corby, the trial
court in People v. Aliceal28 denied the defendant the ability to recall a
witness "for further cross-examination based on newly acquired in-
formation." 29 On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court, reasoning that the information for which fur-
ther cross-examination was requested "had little impact on the
witness's credibility." 3 0 In addition, the court stated the defendant
"had the opportunity to acquire this information earlier in the pro-
ceedings, and could have elicited it during cross-examination." 3 '
Finally, when offered the opportunity to enter into a stipulation to re-
solve the issue, the defendant refused the opportunity.132 The court
declined to review the constitutional issue since the defendant failed
to preserve his constitutional objection; however, the court stated that
if the defendant preserved his objection, no violation existed because
the defendant received a full opportunity to impeach the witness.'
Conversely, in People v. Vargasl34 the New York Court of
Appeals held that due to the centrality of the witness' testimony, the
conviction of the defendant must be reversed and a new trial ordered
125 Id. at 1139.
126 id.
127 Id at 1141.
128 821 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2006).
129 Id at 585.
130 Id.
132 id
13' Alicea, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
134 668 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1996). Four proceedings were consolidated under this title be-
cause they all possessed the common issue, which involved a defendant's right to be perso-
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to determine whether the witness' testimony must be stricken from
the record. 3 5
In Vargas, the defendant, during the commission of a robbery,
shot and killed a man.136 Sharon Valdez testified at trial as an eye-
witness, claiming she observed the incident from her apartment win-
dow and was cross-examined by defense counsel.137 However, after
her testimony she informed defense counsel that "she had [actually]
been asleep on the night of the incident and did not see anything that
occurred."'13  Valdez again appeared in court and asserted her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.139  The defense
moved to have Valdez's testimony stricken; however, the trial court
denied the motion. 140
On appeal, the defendant claimed that although he cross-
examined the witness during the trial, the trial court prevented him
from fully cross-examining the witness after she recanted her prior
incriminating testimony. 14' The New York Court of Appeals ordered
a new trial, reasoning that due to the centrality of Valdez's testimony,
an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the murderer, the trial
court erred when it denied striking the witness' testimony.14 2
Both the United States Constitution and the New York State
Constitution afford individuals the opportunity to confront witnesses
against them through their respective Confrontation Clauses. The
Confrontation Clauses provide an individual the opportunity to effec-
tively cross-examine a witness in order to impeach them, reveal bi-
ases, or show the jury that the witness lacks credibility. However, the
trial judge retains broad discretion to limit cross-examination in both
federal and state courts.
The federal courts appear to put greater emphasis on the im-
portance of cross-examination to the litigation process. As discussed
in Pointer, the right to confront a witness is a fundamental right,
which is necessary in order to ensure a defendant a fair trial. For this
reason, it appears the federal courts afford the defense counsel an op-
SId. at 887.
"3 Id. at 882.
137 id.
138 Id. at 882-83.
3 Vargas, 668 N.E.2d at 883. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 Vargas, 668 N.E.2d at 883.
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portunity to conduct a broad-ranged cross-examination. On the other
hand, while the state courts also appreciate the importance of cross-
examination, the reviewing state courts easily find that the cross-
examination conducted at the trial court level provided the defendant
with an ample opportunity to confront the witnesses against him.
It is clear from both federal and state cases that when an issue
arises as to whether the court afforded the defendant an ample oppor-
tunity to confront the witnesses against him, the courts conduct an
analysis of several factors. A court will look at whether the trial
judge provided the defendant with a full and fair opportunity to probe
and expose the weaknesses in the witness' testimony. The courts will
examine whether the court provided the defendant with an ample op-
portunity to expose the biases of the witness, which demonstrates the
witness' overall credibility. Furthermore, the courts consider the
overall impact of the testimony-whether the testimony consisted of
a minor issue or concerned an issue central to the outcome of the
case-in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in
limiting cross-examination.
In Montes, the court appears to have misapplied some of these
factors. While the court afforded the defense an opportunity to cross-
examine Ceballo, the defendant discovered new, crucial information
once the cross-examination ended and the court prohibited further
follow-up questioning once this information came to light. Addition-
ally, the court failed to adequately allow the defense to expose Cebal-
lo's bias as it pertained to her credibility. Because Ceballo acquired
the gun or guns after the shooting, she possessed the motive to lie to
protect her own interests. Further, without the ability to cross-
examine her regarding this critical issue, the defendant lacked the op-
portunity to expose her bias to the jury. Lastly, the court erroneously
categorized the issue of whether Gonzalez and Montes placed one or
two guns into Ceballo's bag as only a minor portion of the testimony.
Similar to the testimony in Vargas, Ceballo's testimony was
central to the determination of the case against the defendant. If Ce-
ballo received one gun and Castro's testimony-that Gonzalez pos-
sessed the only gun and shot Lopez-remained uncontroverted, this
clearly established the fact that the elements for possession of a wea-
pon were not met. Also, as in Vargas, after the witness presented her
testimony, new information-information conflicting with the testi-
mony given on the stand-was revealed. The court in Montes should
822 [Vol. 27
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have followed the reasoning in Vargas and concluded that due to the
centrality of the witness' testimony, the trial court erred by failing to
strike the testimony.
Although the reasoning in Montes is consistent with that of
other New York State cases, in that the court deferred to the "reason-
able" discretion of the trial court, the majority erred by failing to re-
verse the holding of the trial court, which stated that the court pro-
vided the defense with a full and fair opportunity to adequately cross-
examine Ceballo. The majority should have followed the reasoning
of the dissent, which is in conformity with the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the Second Circuit.
The dissent in Montes supported the position that the court in-
accurately interpreted controlling Confrontation Clause case law.
Notably, the dissent distinguished the circumstances in Montes from
the circumstances in Alicea. Similar to Montes, Alicea involved new-
ly-acquired information. However, the court in Alicea reasoned that
because the defense had access to the information prior to the cross-
examination of the witness, the defense had the opportunity to dis-
cuss the information during the initial cross-examination. However,
in Montes, the newly-acquired information only became available di-
rectly after the defense finished the cross-examination of the most
critical witness. Therefore, without prior knowledge of this informa-
tion, the defendant missed his opportunity to adequately cross-
examine the witness. The reasoning of the majority is thus severely
flawed since the newly-acquired information, which Ceballo failed to
reveal in her testimony, provided critical new facts which may have
fully exonerated the defendant.
Further, the dissent in Montes is strikingly similar to the dis-
sent in Corby, which is also in conformity with the United States Su-
preme Court and Second Circuit case law. Like in Montes, the court
in Corby refused to allow a full cross-examination of a key witness
on the most crucial evidence presented at trial. Ceballo, like the key
witness in Corby, possessed the only personal knowledge of the evi-
dence directly linking the defendant to the gun. The prosecution re-
peatedly made Ceballo's testimony a "key issue" in the trial, inter-
viewing her further after her direct and cross-examination testimony,
and then introducing a new witness, a prisoner brought in to testify to
the material that Ceballo failed to mention while on the stand. With-
out the ability to cross-examine the only witness with personal know-
8232011]
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ledge of the critical new evidence, the court violated Montes's Con-
frontation Clause rights.
Rather than deferring to the discretion of the trial court, the
dissents in both Montes and Corby inquired into whether the court in
fact afforded the defendant a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against them. Although the dissent recognized
the importance of providing the trial judge with discretion to limit
cross-examination, it also recognized the importance of a fair trial
and the guarantee of a fundamental right afforded to a criminal de-
fendant, the ability to confront witnesses against him. The latter rec-
ognition ultimately proved superior to the dissent's determination that
the court violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
Lastly, the majority in Montes arbitrarily concluded that if the
trial court in fact erred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The majority misplaced its reasoning based on inconclusive
forensic evidence, which tended neither to convincingly prove nor
disprove the existence of two guns at the scene of the crime when the
shooting occurred. In accordance with the reasoning of the dissent,
without Ceballo's testimony regarding the existence of two guns at
the scene, the prosecution's case proved weak at best. Although the
Court in Van Arsdall rejected the per se error rule, it adopted the
harmless error analysis test, which required a showing that the error
failed to contribute to the verdict. According to the dissent in Montes
the error complained of weighed heavily on the verdict. Without the
ability to recall Ceballo, or in the alternative to strike her testimony,
the prosecution lacked any substantial evidentiary connection be-
tween the defendant and the shooting. Therefore, the error could not
be regarded as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the New York Court of Appeals continues to uphold the in-
accurate and flawed reasoning of the trial courts, adequate cross-
examination will become a practice of the past. Trial judges must
impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination, or risk eroding
a fundamental right and critical procedure of litigation. Further, in
order to prevent injustice and to guarantee a defendant a full and fair
trial, the New York Court of Appeals must always conduct an inde-
pendent investigation into whether the limitations placed on
824 [Vol. 27
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cross-examination by the trial court are in fact reasonable.
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